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The Impact of Organizational Structure and Lending Technology 
on Banking Competition 
 
Abstract: Recent theoretical models argue that a bank’s organizational structure reflects its 
lending technology.  A hierarchically organized bank will employ mainly hard information, 
whereas a decentralized bank will rely more on soft information.  We investigate theoretically 
and empirically how bank organization shapes banking competition.  Our theoretical model 
illustrates how a bank’s geographical reach and loan pricing strategy is determined not only 
by its own organizational structure but also by organizational choices made by its rivals.  We 
take our model to the data by estimating the impact of the rival banks’ organization on the 
geographical reach and loan pricing of a singular, large bank in Belgium.  We employ 
detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans granted to small firms, 
comprising the entire loan portfolio of this large bank, and information on the organizational 
structure of all rival banks located in the vicinity of the borrower.  We find that the 
organizational structure of the close rival banks matters for both branch reach and loan 
pricing.  The geographical footprint of the lending bank is smaller when the close rival banks 
are large, hierarchically organized, and technologically advanced.  Such rival banks may rely 
more on hard information.  Large rival banks in the vicinity also lower the degree of spatial 
pricing.  We also find that the effects on spatial pricing are more pronounced for firms that 
generate less hard information, such as small firms.  In short, size and hierarchy of rival banks 
in the vicinity influences both branch reach and loan pricing of the lender. 
 
Keywords: banking sector, bank size, competition, and mode of organization. 
JEL: G21, L11, L14.   2
Introduction 
The allocation of control within organizations shapes agents’ incentives (see e.g. Hart 
(1995)).  Stein (2002), for example, shows that a centralized hierarchical bank offers greater 
incentives to employ information that is easy to communicate and store within an 
organization – i.e., “hard” information – whereas, in contrast, a decentralized bank provides 
an environment advantageous to “soft” information.  And Petersen and Rajan (2002) 
document that banks that rely more on hard information communicate in more impersonal 
ways with their borrowers.  Hence, the bank’s mode of organization influences the lending 
technology employed. 
We present a stylized model that embeds these findings to explain geographical reach and 
spatial pricing in lending. We build a spatial discrimination model, starting from a Hotelling 
(1929) – framework, to show how the bank’s own organization and its rivals’ organizational 
choices may shape banking competition.  In particular, we incorporate how bank hierarchy 
influences distance-related transportation costs incurred by either borrowers or banks.  Our 
model shows that when rival banks are more hierarchically layered, the bank’s own 
geographical reach shrinks and spatial pricing softens.  The underlying rationale is simply that 
hierarchically organized rival banks employ more hard information in reaching their loan 
decisions, reducing either the borrowers’ or their own transportation costs. 
To test key hypotheses emanating from our theory, we combine two unique data sets that 
contain detailed loan contract, firm, branch and bank information (including organizational 
form).  The first data set contains detailed contract information, including firm and lending 
branch location, for more than 15,000 loans to (mainly) small businesses.  The second data 
set includes comprehensive information on all 145 banks operating in Belgium, detailing for 
7,477 branches: (1) physical location, (2) organizational position and status, and (3)   3
communication technology.  Consequently, the combined dataset encompasses information 
on the complete set of loans granted to small and medium-sized business borrowers by a 
single large bank in Belgium and the organization structure of all the branches of rival banks 
in the vicinity of the borrower’s location, resulting in around 250,000 borrower – rival bank 
branch combinations. 
We exploit the heterogeneity in the competing banks’ organizational structure to identify the 
impact lending technology has on the geographical reach and spatial pricing at bank branches.  
Our empirical proxies for organizational complexity of the closest rival financial institutions 
are bank size, country affiliation, the degree of organizational hierarchy, and the presence of a 
fax. 
We find that the organizational form of the closest rivals matters for branch reach as well as 
for the degree of spatial pricing.  The presence of a large, more hierarchically organized, and 
technologically advanced rival bank in the vicinity shrinks the geographical reach of the 
lending branch, as lending decisions of large banks possibly become more driven by hard 
information.  In line with out theoretical predictions, we also find that the negative effect on 
branch reach of the presence of a large, more hierarchically organized, or technologically 
advanced competing bank is less negatively affected for small opaque firms. The presence in 
the vicinity of the borrower of a large rival bank also attenuates spatial pricing.  Hence size 
and hierarchy of rival banks in the vicinity of a borrower determine both geographical reach 
and loan pricing. 
Empirical work analyzing how the nature of a bank’s organization affects the way it does 
business typically suffers from a lack of data on the organizational form of the banks.  
Existing work typically uses the size of the bank as a proxy for organizational complexity.  
Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2005), for example, show that small banks are   4
indeed better able to collect and act on soft information.  They also report that large banks 
lend at greater distance and in a more impersonal way than small banks do. Liberti (2004) 
examines how a change in the organizational form within a large bank affects incentives.  He 
finds that the reliance on soft information is higher under decentralized than centralized 
structures.  Liberti (2005) analyzes how information flows within the organization both across 
layers (vertically) and horizontally (number of branch officers reporting to a supervisor).  He 
demonstrates that loan applications that need to pass more organizational layers for approval 
are based more on hard information.  This internal ‘hardening’ of the information 
requirements however is mitigated when direct contact between the bottom and top 
organizational layer is possible.  Also loans granted directly by the branch, as well as 
branches with ‘leaner’ horizontal organization can employ more soft information. 
We contribute to this empirical literature by constructing and analyzing a novel dataset that 
contains information on the hierarchical structure of all competing banks in a particular 
locality in Belgium, and by highlighting the role of rival banks’ organizational form. 
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section II introduces a stylized model of 
banking competition. Section III introduces the data and variables employed in the empirical 
analysis. Section IV presents our empirical results. Section V concludes. 
I.  Theory 
Recent theoretical and empirical work highlights the importance of geographical distance for 
the mode of interaction between banks and firms and for pricing of bank loans.  In this 
section we model and explore the impact of bank heterogeneity on bank branch reach and 
loan pricing.  We develop a stylized model in which firms can borrow from different banks. 
Banks themselves may have a different organizational form creating a different specialization 
in dealing with hard or soft information. We take the organizational form as exogenously   5
given.  We then formulate testable hypotheses about the impact of bank type on branch reach 
and loan pricing.  In particular, our model identifies how distance-related costs that are bank 
specific further increase the economic relevancy of geography and spatial pricing. 
A.  Literature 
Our main point of departure is that lending conditions not only depend on the distance 
between the borrower and the lender and the distance between the borrower and the closest 
competing bank, but also on the characteristics of the banks involved.  Our stylized 
framework finds its inspiration in location differentiation models following Hotelling 
(1929)(see Armstrong (2005) for a review).  In these models, customers, in casu borrowers, 
are typically assumed to incur identical (per unit of distance) transportation costs when 
visiting a firm, i.e. a bank branch.  An alternative, but for our purposes strikingly similar, 
interpretation is developed in Sussman and Zeira (1995).  They model spatial pricing based 
on distance-related monitoring costs faced by the banks.  In their model the banks also face 
identical per unit of distance monitoring costs.  While we will formally derive our hypotheses 
placing the (differential) transportation costs with the borrower, as is done in most models, 
we also acknowledge the equivalent interpretation in which, as said, it is the lenders that face 
the distance-related monitoring costs. 
Why would borrower or lender transportation costs depend on the type or organizational 
form of banks involved?  One straightforward explanation consists in the number of visits the 
borrower has to make to the bank branch to obtain and service a loan (or the number of visits 
the lender makes to screen and monitor the borrower).  For example, if a borrower knows her 
loan officer at the branch will insist on three face-to-face visits before granting the loan (say 
one visit to file the loan application, one visit to negotiate the loan conditions, and one visit to 
sign the final loan contract), her expected transportation costs will be three times the costs   6
visiting a one-stop bank branch were loan applications are approved on the spot (or by mail 
afterwards).  Alternatively, the borrower may know that loan officers from one bank show up 
three times a year to check on their borrowers’ business, while another bank may have a 
hands-off approach (entailing no monitoring).  In both cases borrower and bank ex ante know 
how many screening and/or monitoring visits are required to fully bridge their informational 
asymmetries. 
Recent theoretical work explains why loan officers working for different banks may handle 
loan applications differently, causing the number of required visits to vary.  Stein (2002) for 
example models the collection and transfer of information within hierarchical versus 
decentralized financial institutions.  Stein shows that centralization motivates loan officers 
located in the branches to compile and transfer hard information (e.g., accounting numbers) to 
support their demand for internal capital.  Decentralization of decision-making on the other 
hand provides loan officers incentives to collect and rely more on soft information (e.g., 
impressions of borrower character), information that is by nature more difficult to obtain and 
to transfer in an internal funding request. 
If loan officers rely mostly on hard information, face-to-face contact with the borrower 
becomes less important and more impersonal ways of communicating (such as telephone, fax, 
or email) will gain ground (Petersen and Rajan (2002)).
1  The number of personal visits that is 
necessary to arrive at a loan decision or to monitor the borrower will become smaller.  On the 
other hand, when more soft information is employed, loan officers may want to meet the 
applicant or visit her professional premises at least a few times to screen and monitor the loan 
                                                 
1 Petersen and Rajan (2002) show that in the case of the US, where credit scoring of small business borrowers 
has become common practice among banks, the distance between small firms and their lenders has been 
increasing and banks and firms started to communicate in more impersonal ways.  In Belgium, however, credit 
scoring of small firms was virtually non-existent during our sample period (1995-1997), and hence distance still 
plays an important role for the firms in our sample.   7
application.  As a result, distance related costs per loan in the latter (“soft”) case will be 
higher than in the former (“hard”) case. 
Our stylized framework assumes that when the transportation costs are incurred, bank 
officers perfectly solve the asymmetric information problem. We therefore assume that loans 
are repaid with probability one (as long as the probability of repayment is identical across 
borrowers and banks, qualitatively the same results hold).  Hauswald and Marquez (2006), on 
the other hand, specify a model where the quality of information decreases with distance and 
informational problems linger.  In particular in their model the informational signal the bank 
receives from close borrowers is more precise than the signal from far borrowers.  As a 
consequence the winner’s curse problem exacerbates when the bank engages a borrower close 
to the rival bank.  Banks also decide on the level of information acquisition in Hauswald and 
Marquez (2006).  More information acquisition aggravates the winner’s curse problem and 
increases (in absolute value) the association between distance and the loan rate.  However 
their model only deals with symmetric equilibria in which banks invest an equal amount in 
information acquisition.  As a result their “transportation costs” are identical, while we, in 
admittedly a much more stylized setup, allow for differences in transportation costs. 
B.  Model 
We now introduce the different transportation costs into the stylized framework to explore 
its impact on bank branch reach and loan pricing.  As discussed previously, different 
transportation costs capture the differences in the number of visits borrowers or lenders make, 
possibly as a result of the varying bank organizational structure influencing the banks’ usage 
of hard and soft information.  We analyze first branch reach and loan pricing when firms 
differ only in terms of location (subsections 1-3), but where banks differ in their usage of hard   8
and soft information.  Afterwards we turn to the case where firms are also heterogeneous in 
the availability of hard and soft information in their loan application (subsection 4). 
1.  Non-Linear Transportation Costs 
Formally we assume there are two bank branches from two different banks, denoted A and 
B, at opposite ends of a line of length L.  We interchangeably employ bank and branch as 
they coincide in our theoretical setup.  Borrowers are uniformly distributed across the line 
with density one.  We assume that a borrower located at  x faces non-linear transportation 
costs 
￿
x tA  and 
￿
) ( x L tB   in visiting bank A and B respectively.  The slope parameters  A t  and 
B t  are associated with the impact of distance to reach bank A and B, respectively.  Bhaskar 
and To (2004) derive the solution to this non-linear transportation problem for the case where 
the slope parameters are equal;  B A t t   .  We study the more general case  B A t t z , with the 
difference capturing (as already indicated) the fact that banks may have different screening 
and monitoring technologies and may rely on a different mix of hard and soft information.  
In taking a loan at bank A, a borrower located at x incurs a cost: 
￿
x t r A Ax  , 
with  Ax r the (net of repayment of the initial investment) loan rate charged by bank A to a 
borrower located at  x.  Similarly, borrowing from bank B implies a cost: 
￿
) ( x L t r B Bx   . 
A borrower located at  x is indifferent between borrowing from A or B when: 
￿
￿
) ( x L t r x t r B Bx A Ax      . 
We assume that borrowers cannot arbitrage among each other in order to benefit from lower 
loan rates and that their willingness to pay is high enough to guarantee they take a loan in   9
equilibrium.  We further assume that both banks have information about the borrower’s 
location before pricing the loan and that both banks have information about the transportation 
costs the borrowers face to visit either bank, such that banks perfectly price discriminate 
based upon borrower’s location and the difference in transportation costs to visit either bank 
branch (as in Thisse and Vives (1988)). 
For a borrower close by, i.e.,  0   x , bank A enjoys some local market power, as from the 
borrower’s perspective bank B’s best loan rate offer is its marginal cost of obtaining funds 
plus her own transportation costs to B.  We normalize marginal costs for both banks to zero.  
It is clear then that branch A can charge 
￿
L t r B A   0 .  That is, branch A can appropriate the 
borrower’s transportation cost to branch B.  Similarly, for  L x   , branch B charges 
￿
L t r A BL    
and appropriates that borrower’s transportation cost to branch A. 
Let  y  be the borrower that receives a perfectly competitive loan rate  0     By Ay r r , as: 
￿
￿
) ( y L t y t B A    . 





x t x L t r A B Ax     . 
That is, bank A charges a borrower at  x the savings in transportation costs it makes from 
borrowing at A rather than B. 
Bank A’s total borrower portfolio  y  or geographical reach is determined by  0   Ay r , such 
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Hence, our stylized model yields two testable hypotheses: (1) the geographical reach  y  of 
branch A depend on  A t  and on  B t , and (2) the slope of spatial pricing 
dx
drAx  is negative and 
depends on  A t  and  B t .  While bank A’s reach increases in the rival’s transportation costs  B t  
but decreases in the own transportation cost  A t , the degree of spatial pricing measured by the 
absolute value of the slope increases in  A t  and  B t . 
2.  Linear Transportation Costs 
To illustrate the main intuition in our model we set  1   L  and  1   D .  In this case the 







  . 
All borrowers “to the left” of y ( 1 0 d d d y x ) are served by branch A at a loan rate: 
  x t t t x t x t r B A B A B Ax ) ( 1         . 
The other borrowers ( 1 0 d d d x y ) are served by branch B at loan rate: 
  x t t t x t x t r B A B B A Bx ) ( 1          . 
                                                 
2 In our empirical investigation, we assume logarithmic transportation costs.  This yields similar predictions.   11
Figure 1 displays the resulting linear loan rate schedules for borrowers of both A and B.  The 
figure further highlights the two testable implications of our model.  First, market shares y of 












, respectively.  Hence a decrease in transportation 
cost to the rival branch reduces the own market share.  The opposite result holds for the own 
transportation cost (notice that a uniform distribution of borrowers further implies that market 
share equals branch size; since the length of the line is normalized to one, branch size equals 
in this case geographical reach).  Second, the rate at which both branches discriminate in 
distance (i.e., the absolute value of the slopes of both schedules) equals  B A t t  , hence 
increases in  A t  and  B t . 
To conclude, differential transportation costs determine branch geographical reach and loan 
pricing.  In particular relatively lower transportation costs to a rival bank branch will limit the 
geographical reach of the own branch and the slope of spatial pricing.  Before we turn to 
testing these two predictions, we analyze how branch-specific marginal costs and borrower-
specific transportation costs enrich this picture. 
3.  Differences in Bank-Specific Marginal Cost 
Assume for example that the marginal cost for bank B equals  0 ! P , while the marginal cost 
for bank A equals zero.  With appropriate modifications,  P  could also reflect the differential 
repayment probabilities to the two branches.  Bank A now appropriates the close borrower’s 
transportation cost to bank B plus the marginal cost differential.  Hence, for  0   x , bank A 
charges  P    B A t r 0 .  Bank B can only charge  A B t r   0  to the close borrower.  Let  y  again 
be the borrower that receives the most competitive loan rate from both A and B, i.e.  0   Ay r  











All borrowers “to the left” of y ( 1 0 d d d y x ) are served by bank A at a loan rate: 
  x t t t x t x t r B A B A B Ax ) ( 1           P P . 
The other borrowers ( 1 0 d d d x y ) are served by bank B at loan rate: 
  x t t t x t x t r B A B B A Bx ) ( 1          . 
To conclude, the market reach (and share) of bank A increases in the marginal cost 
differential  P .  However the rate at which both banks discriminate remains unaltered and 
equal to  B A t t  . 
4.  “Soft Firm – Hard Firm” and “Soft Bank – Hard Bank” 
Borrower-specific transportation costs may stem from borrowers differing in the soft and 
hard information they can provide when applying for a loan.  We consider an “informational 
portfolio” with two components: soft and hard information.  Let G  describe the “value” of 
the soft information in the borrower’s portfolio, while    G  1  is the corresponding value of 
the hard information, with  > @ 0,1 G  .  Borrowers differ in the relevancy of soft and hard 
information they can employ in their loan applications; that is borrowers differ in their G .  
For example, larger and older firms may generate no relevant soft information (as there are 
many decision makers operating in a professional and objectified environment, for example) 
but possess a lot of hard information and therefore may have a G  close to zero.  These are 
“hard firms”.  In contrast, small and young firms may lack verifiable and relevant hard 
information such that loan decisions are based mostly on soft information, implying a G  
close to one; i.e. these firms will be “soft firms”.  We model borrower-specific transportation   13
costs to branch i to equal (and again assuming for simplicity that  1   D  and  1   L , and that 







i i i h s t , 
with  i s  and  i h  the transportation costs of the borrower to bank i associated with hard and 
soft information, respectively. 



































































All borrowers “to the left” of y ( 1 0 d d d y x ) are served by branch A at a loan rate: 
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The other borrowers ( 1 0 d d d x y ) are served by branch B at loan rate: 
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In order to identify the implications for market shares and spatial pricing, we introduce some 





  K . 
This parameter K captures the cost of using hard information when going to bank A relative 
to the cost of going to bank B.  We call bank B “hard” when  1 t K .  K is larger than one, for 
example, if bank B is larger or more hierarchical than bank A and as a result handles hard   14
information more effectively than bank A.  Alternatively bank B may have invested more in 
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hence bank A may also have an absolute advantage in handling soft information if  1  EK .  





  W . 
This parameter captures the relative cost of using soft versus hard information when going 
to the (rival) bank and we assume  1 ! W .  Hence W  captures the “technology” that is available 
to relay soft versus hard information and may increase, for example, when transmitting hard 
information using new communication technology becomes relatively easier.  Using this new 








This simple expression can be analyzed quite easily.  We find that bank A’s market share y 
increases in G  (i.e. in firm’s employing more soft information), when bank A has a 
comparative advantage, or  1 0 d d E .  Figure 2 displays the market share of both banks A and 
B (on the horizontal axis) as a function of K (on the vertical axis).  If firms use only hard 







The figure displays this schedule in bold.  Bank’s A market share is clearly a decreasing 
function of the hardness of bank B.  On the other hand, if firms use only soft information 







and if bank A has a comparative advantage in handling soft information, i.e.  1  E , this 
latter “soft firm schedule” is situated to the right of the former “hard firm schedule”.  If bank 
A does not have this comparative advantage, i.e. if  1 ! E , its market share is further reduced 
and the “soft firm schedule” is situated to the left of the “hard firm schedule”.  Even in that 
case however, it is still possible for bank A to have a larger market share than bank B if K  is 
small enough for  1  EK .  To conclude, A’s market share decreases in the hardness of B, but 
this effect is partly mitigated for soft firms in case A has a comparative advantage in handling 
soft information.
3 
Next we analyze the degree of spatial pricing.  For borrowers “to the left” of y 
( 1 0 d d d y x ) served by branch A the slope at which the loan rate varies with distance 
equals: 
  ) 1 (
1 1
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3 Interestingly, each bank’s market share or reach  y  remains positive for all type of firms, irrespective of the 
importance of soft information, G , in the loan applications (for all non-zero transportation costs).  The product 
differentiation literature has labeled this phenomenon “horizontal dominance”: location dominates other 
heterogeneity in firm characteristics (see Neven and Thisse (1990) and Degryse (1996), for example).  We find 
that horizontal dominance always arises in environments characterized by spatial price discrimination (but not in 
models with uniform pricing), as a bank enjoys a comparative advantage for its closest borrowers independent of 
the per-unit transportation cost differential between the two banks.   16
























































A decrease in hard transportation costs to bank B ( B h ), for example, will result in a 
softening of spatial pricing practiced by A, especially if hard transportation costs are high 
compared to soft information transportation costs ( 1   W ) and for hard firms  ) 0 (   G . 
To conclude, the differential reliance by borrowers in their loan applications on soft and 
hard information introduces an interesting heterogeneity in the transportation costs in the loan 
granting and monitoring process.  This heterogeneity also determines bank geographical reach 
and loan pricing.  If relaying soft information entails higher transportation costs than 
reporting hard information, borrowers with difficulties producing hard information are more 
likely to be engaged by the bank with the cost advantage in dealing with soft information.  
The “soft bank” obtains a larger market share and spatial pricing is sharper for “soft 
borrowers”, while the “hard” bank will serve firms having more hard information available. 
As such, “soft banks” specialize in “soft firms” whereas “hard banks” specialize in “hard 
firms”.  We test these additional predictions in the empirical section. 
II.  Data and Variables 
The dataset we analyze consists of 15,044 loans made to independents or single-person 
businesses, and small-, medium-, and large-sized firms by an important Belgian bank that 
operates throughout Belgium.  The sample encompasses all existing small and medium 
enterprise loans granted by this bank as of August 10, 1997 that were initiated or repriced 
after January 1, 1995.  The bank is one out a few truly national and general-purpose banks 
operating in Belgium in 1997.  It lends to firms located in most postal zones, and is active in   17
49 different industries.  Around 83% of the firms in its portfolio are single-person businesses 
and most borrowers obtain just one (relatively small) loan from this bank. 
Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) first employed the bank-firm relationships data set. 
Degryse and Ongena (2005) added distance variables and show that two distance-variables 
play a role in loan pricing: distance to lender and distance to closest competitor.  For each 
borrower we calculate the distance to the lending bank’s branch.  We take the natural log of 1 
+ Distance to Lender (ln(1+Distance to Lender)) to accommodate for potential fixed costs in 
transportation.  To identify the impact of the closest competitor, we also compute the distance 
between the borrower and the branches of all other competing banks located in the same 
postal zone as the borrower, and effectively take the 25th percentile.  We label this variable as 
ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitor).  As of December 31st, 1994, we identify 7,477 
branches, operated by 145 different banks and located in 837 different postal zones. 
Each postal zone carries a postal code between 1,000 and 9,999.  The first digit in the code 
indicates a geographical region, which we call “postal area” and which in most cases 
coincides with one of the ten Provinces in Belgium.  A postal zone covers on average 26 sq 
km, and contains on average approximately six bank branches.  A postal area covers 3,359 sq 
km, on average.  Not surprisingly, borrowers are often located in more densely banked areas, 
with on average more than 17 bank branches per postal zone, resulting in around 250,000 
possible borrower – bank branch pairs.  Degryse and Ongena (2005) provide more details on 
computational issues related to our distance-variables as well as other minor sample selection 
issues. 
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the 15,044 contracts of our variables, broken down 
into eight sets of characteristics: (1) dependent variables, (2) transportation cost drivers, (3) 
geographical distance, (4) relationship characteristics, (5) loan contract characteristics, (6)   18
loan purpose, (7) firm characteristics, and (8) interest rate variables. The distance to the 
lender for the median borrower is around 4 minutes and 20 seconds.  The distance to the 
quartile closest competitors for the median borrower in our sample is 3 minutes and 50 
seconds in the same postal zone.  The quartile closest competitor is the bank branch with the 
25
th percentile traveling time located in the same postal zone as the borrower. 
Our theoretical model suggests that the mode of organization of the closest competitor 
matters for the degree of spatial pricing.  The Belgian financial landscape shows substantial 
heterogeneity in rival banks.  In addition to other large banks, a number of smaller (savings) 
banks are present.  To address the impact of organizational structure (labeled as 
“transportation cost drivers”), we combine the loan information data set employed by Degryse 
and Ongena (2005) with a new data set on the type and organizational structure of all bank 
branches in Belgium.  First, we employ a variable “Large Bank”, which measures the relative 
size in terms of total assets of the geographically closest bank relative to the largest bank.  
Large Bank ranges between 0 and 1, and equals 1 when the closest competitor is the largest 
bank.
4  We obtain data on the total assets of all banks in Belgium from the Documenten en 
Aspecten (Documents and Aspects) published by the Belgische Vereniging van Banken 
(Belgian Bankers Association).  Summary statistics reported in Table 1 show that Large Bank 
is on average 0.62. 
Second, we measure the Hierarchy of the closest competitor, both at the bank (“Hierarchy 
Bank”) and at the branch level (“Hierarchy Branch”).  These two variables proxy for the 
degree of hierarchy of the closest competitor and are constructed on the basis of information 
from the 1994 annual report Bankkantoren in België (Bank Branches in Belgium) published 
                                                 
4 In computing Large Bank, we actually employ information on the 25% geographically closest competitors.  To 
illustrate this procedure, suppose there are twelve banks in the postal zone.  Then the 25th percentile includes the 
three closest banks.  When 1 of them is the largest and the two other have half of the size of the largest, then 
Large Bank equals 2/3.   19
by the Belgische Vereniging van Banken (Belgian Bankers Association).  This document lists 
to which branch higher up in the hierarchy of the bank each of the 7,477 branches reports.  
For each branch in the bank we follow this ‘chain of command’ all the way up to the top and 
count the layers traveled.  This is our branch-specific measure of hierarchy.  Hierarchy 
Branch ranges between zero and five.  We also average across the branches of each bank.  We 
then take the value of this measure for the closest competitor,
5 and scale by the maximum 
across banks (which is around 4).  This constitutes our measure of hierarchy for each bank 
“Hierarchy Bank”.  By construction Hierarchy Bank ranges between zero and one.  The 
average is 0.366 indicating that the competing bank branch has around 1.5 levels of 
organizational layers above it. 
In addition to bank size and hierarchy, we also focus on whether the closest competitor is a 
Foreign Bank or not.  This variable also ranges between zero and one and would equal one 
when the closest competing branch is a branch of a foreign bank.  The mean of Foreign Bank 
is about 0.035 suggesting that only occasionally the closest competing branch is a branch of a 
foreign bank.  The reasoning for distinguishing foreign banks from others is that foreign 
banks may focus more on hard information in their decision-making (Mian (2006)). 
Our last-but-one variable computes the fraction of closest competitors that have a Fax 
number listed in the 1994 annual report Bankkantoren in België (Bank Branches in Belgium) 
published by the Belgische Vereniging van Banken (Belgian Bankers Association).  The 
presence of a fax allows for a more impersonal mode of communication and introduces 
greater possibilities to transfer hard information between borrower and bank (Petersen and 
Rajan, 2002) as well as within the bank. About two thirds of competing banks had a fax at the 
end of 1994.  Finally, we include an Urban dummy that equals one if the borrower is located 
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in an agglomeration with more than 250,000 inhabitants, and is zero otherwise.  Borrowers in 
an urban setting may face more congestion when traveling to their banks. 
Our theoretical model suggests employing two different dependent variables.  The first is 
Branch Reach.  We distinguish Quartile Reach, computed as the log of one plus the traveling 
time of the branch’s quartile most remote borrower and the branch itself, in minutes, and 
Maximum Reach, representing the log of one plus the maximum distance between the most 
remote borrower and the branch.  The mean across all branches for Quartile (Maximum) 
Reach is 2.60 (3.52), translating into approximately 14 (40) minutes traveling time to the 
remote borrower (see Table 1). 
The second dependent variable is the Loan Rate, the interest rate on the loan until the next 
revision.  For fixed interest rate loans, this is the yield to maturity of the loan.  For variable 
interest rate loans, this is the interest rate until the date at which the interest rate will be 
revised as stipulated in the contract.  The average interest rate on a loan in our sample is 
8.12% or 812 basis points (we employ basis points throughout the paper).  The loan rate 
varies widely not only nationally (the standard deviation is 236 basis points), but also at the 
branch level (the average standard deviation at the branch level is still 217 basis points). 
Our dataset further includes postal zone variables, relationship characteristics, loan 
characteristics and purpose, firm characteristics, and interest rate variables.  We calculate 
both the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), as the summed squares of bank market shares 
by number of branches in borrower’s postal zone, and the Number of Firms registered in the 
borrower’s postal zone (in thousands).  The HHI equals 0.17 on average while the Number of 
Firms is around 0.75 (i.e. 750 firms) on average in each postal zone. 
Our dataset further includes two relationship characteristics, Main Bank and Duration of 
Relationship.  Main Bank indicates whether this bank considers itself to be the main bank of   21
that firm or not.  The bank’s definition in determining whether it is the main bank or not is 
“having a monthly ‘turnover’ on the current account of at least BEF 100,000 (U.S. Dollar 
2,500), and buying at least two products from the bank”.  More than half of all borrowers are 
classified as Main Bank customers.  Main Bank captures the scope of the relationship.  The 
Duration of the Relationship measures the number of years the firm has had a relationship 
with that particular bank at the time the loan rate is decided upon.  A relationship starts when 
a firm buys for the first time a product from that bank.  The average duration of the 
relationship in the sample is about eight years. 
Our loan contract characteristics encompass four dummies capturing the effect of the 
“revisability” of the loan, as some loan contracts allow resetting the loan rate at fixed dates 
subject to contractual terms.  Other loan characteristics are Collateral and Repayment 
Duration of Loan.  The variable Collateral indicates whether the loan is collateralized or not.  
Approximately 26% of the loans are collateralized.  We assume, as in Berger and Udell 
(1995) and Elsas and Krahnen (1998), among others, that collateral and interest rate 
conditions are determined sequentially, with the collateral decision preceding the interest rate 
determination. 
Another loan contract characteristic is the Repayment Duration of the Loan.  For all loans to 
the firms, we know at what ‘speed’ the loans are repaid.  This allows us to compute the 
repayment duration of a loan.  We include the natural logarithm of (one plus) this variable in 
the regression analysis in order to proxy for the risk associated with the time until the loan is 
repaid. 
We also include dummies capturing the loan purpose.  We have seven types of loans in our 
sample.  While we cannot reveal the relative importance of the types of loans, we include the 
seven loan purpose dummies in Table 1 for convenient reference.  We further include a   22
separate Rollover dummy (also listed in the Loan Purpose category), which takes a value of 
one if the loan is given to prepay another loan, and is zero otherwise. 
The firm characteristics include both proxies for the size and legal form of the firm.  In 
terms of firm size, a distinction can be made between Single-Person Businesses (82.98% of 
the sample), Small (15.99%), Medium (0.89%), and Large (0.14%) Firms; and in terms of 
legal form of organization, a distinction is made between Sole Proprietorships (82.22%), 
Limited Partnerships (11.97%), Limited Partnerships with Equal Sharing (1.18%), 
Corporations (3.78%), and Temporary Arrangements (0.85%).  In the regressions, we exclude 
the dummies for Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships.  We include 49 two-digit 
NACE code dummies to capture industry characteristics. 
The interest rate variables are incorporated to control for the underlying cost of capital in the 
economy.  The first is the interest rate on a Belgian Government Security with the same 
repayment duration as the loan granted to the firm.  Secondly, we include a Term Spread, 
defined as the difference between the yield on a Belgian government bond with repayment 
duration of five years and the yield on a 3-month Treasury bill.  Finally, we incorporate two 
year dummies for 1996 and 1997 (with 1995 the base case) to control for business cycle 
effects. 
III. Empirical Results 
A.  Organizational Structure and Branch Reach 
1.  Control Variables 
We now turn to the first implication of our theoretical model developed in Section II:  the 
geographical reach of branches and the role of the competing banks’ organizational structure.  
We employ two indicators of branch reach.  Quartile Reach captures the distance to the   23
quartile most remote borrower (Models I to VII in Table 2 and Models I to VI in Table 3).  
Maximum Reach measures the distance to the most remote borrower of the branch (Models 
VIII and IX in Table 2 and Models VII and VIII in Table 3). 
As most control variables remain virtually unaltered throughout the exercises in this paper, 
we only discuss them once.  We tabulate key coefficients in Table 2 and a complete set of 
coefficients for selected specifications in an Appendix.  In Table 2 we include the HHI to 
control for banking competition.  As already indicated we resort to using the number of bank 
branches of each bank in the postal zone to construct market shares.  The estimate of the 
coefficient on HHI (0.12) implies that an increase of 0.1 in the HHI, say from a competitive 
(HHI < 0.1) to a “highly concentrated” (HHI > 0.18) market, would increase reach by less 
than 0.5 percent.  A doubling from the Number of Firms registered in the borrower’s postal 
zone, at the mean, would increase reach by 1.25 percent. 
The impact of the bank-firm relationship characteristics is captured by Main Bank and the 
ln(1+Duration of Relationship).  The coefficient on Main Bank is mostly insignificant, while 
the coefficient on Duration is negative and significant but economically quite small.  The loan 
contract characteristics include whether the loan is collateralized, its repayment duration, and 
the loan revisability options (these coefficients are tabulated in the Appendix).  Only the 
coefficient on collateral is significant but economically close-to irrelevant.  To conclude, our 
control variables reveal that in less concentrated banking markets and when more firms are in 
the postal zone, geographical reach increases somewhat. 
2.  Rivals’ Organizational Structure 
In addition to the set of control variables, the regression models include our five indicators 
of the rivals’ organizational structure, Large Bank, Hierarchy Bank, Hierarchy Branch, 
Foreign Bank, and Fax.  In some specifications we also control for Urban location.  Almost   24
all organizational coefficients are negative and are statistically significant throughout Models 
I to IX, in particular the coefficients on both the Hierarchy and Fax variables.  Branch reach is 
substantially curtailed when the closest competitors are hierarchical or have a fax.  Quartile 
Reach in Model VII, for example, decreases by almost 30 percent at its mean, from 13.5 to 
9.5 minutes, when the branches of the closest competitor are situated below a pyramidal 
structure (Hierarchy Branch = 5) versus when the branches are reporting to a flat upper deck 
(Hierarchy Branch = 0).  Similarly, when the closest competitors have a fax but the own 
branch does not, then the quartile branch reach drops by almost 25 percent.  These results are 
further robust to using the Maximum Reach (Models VIII and IX) as dependent variable.  In 
addition, facing a Foreign Bank now also shrinks the maximum reach.  All in all, we find 
these results in line with the predictions of our model, suggesting that when rivals’ 
organizational structure is such that transportation costs are lower, the bank’s geographical 
reach reduces. 
To test the “soft-hard hypothesis” of our model, we interact our hierarchy variables with the 
Small Firm dummy in Table 3.  Our findings indicate that while reach is negatively affected 
by the presence of “hard” rivals, i.e. (large) hierarchical rivals with faxes, the effects are 
partly mitigated when firms are “soft”, i.e. small.  This result indicates that the reach of banks 
that specialize in collecting and processing soft information is less affected by rival 
competition than those specializing in hard information. 
B.  Organizational Structure and Loan Pricing 
Next we analyze the determinants of the loan rate by regressing the Loan Rate (in basis 
points) on our “transportation cost drivers”, relationship, competition, and control variables, 
which as already indicated include loan contract characteristics, loan purpose, firm 
characteristics, and interest rates.  We use ordinary least squares estimation.  Our first model   25
in Table 4 highlights a parsimonious fixed-effects specification containing only distance and 
control variables and then we turn to specifications containing also the interactions between 
distance and bank organization variables in Models II to VI. 
1.  Control Variables 
As most control variables remain virtually unaltered throughout the exercises in this paper, 
we again only discuss them once (tabulated in Column III in the Appendix).  The impact of 
the bank-firm relationship characteristics is captured by Main Bank and the ln(1+Duration of 
Relationship).  Main bank captures the scope of the bank-firm relationship.  The loan rate 
decreases 55 basis points when the scope of the relationship is sufficiently broad (Main bank 
= 1).  The Appendix also shows that the loan rate increases with the duration of the 
relationship (see also Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000)).  For example, an increase in 
duration from the median (7.5 years) to the median plus one standard deviation (13 years) 
increases the loan rate by around 10 basis points. 
The loan contract characteristics include whether the loan is collateralized, its repayment 
duration, and the loan revisability options.  A collateralized loan carries a loan rate that is 
approximately 38 basis points lower.  This result is in line with the sorting-by-private-
information paradigm, which predicts that safer borrowers pledge more collateral (e.g., 
Besanko and Thakor (1987)), but differs from the empirical findings of Berger and Udell 
(1990) and Berger and Udell (1995), and with Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Machauer and 
Weber (1998) who report a positive (though economically small) effect of collateralization on 
loan rates. 
The coefficient of ln(1+Repayment Duration of Loan) is significantly negative at a 1% level: 
An increase in duration from say five to six years reduces the loan rate by 17 basis points.  
We also include four loan revisability dummies (but do not tabulate these coefficients to   26
conserve space).  However, we can reject (at a 1% significance level) the hypothesis of the 
joint equality to zero of the coefficients of the four loan revisability dummies.  The coefficient 
on the Rollover dummy indicates that if a loan is given to prepay another loan, the loan rate 
increases by approximately 15 basis points.  Term, Bridge, and Consumer Credit loans carry a 
significantly lower loan rate.  However, again we can report the rejection, at a 1% 
significance level, of the hypothesis of the joint equality to zero of the coefficients of the six 
Loan Purpose dummies. 
The Appendix also shows that Small Firms pay a higher interest rate, while Medium and 
Large Firms pay a significantly lower interest rate than do Single-Person Businesses (the base 
case).  This non-monotonicity is due to differences in legal exposure.  Almost all Single-
Person Businesses are Sole Proprietors, and owners thus face unlimited liability for their 
business debts.  On the other hand, all Small Firms are Partnerships, Corporations, or 
Temporary Arrangements; their owners for the most part face only limited liability.  
Diversification and reputation effects (due to increased firm size) eventually overwhelm the 
impact of limited liability, however, and lower the loan rate for the average Medium and 
Large Firms.  Corporations and Limited Partnerships with Equal Sharing pay a significantly 
lower interest rate than do Sole Proprietorships, possibly reflecting both the effects of limited 
liability and increased firm size.  While few individual coefficients on either the eight postal 
area or the 49 industry dummies are significant, both sets of coefficients are highly significant 
as a group. 
The interest rate variables are important in explaining the variation of the loan rate.  The 
change in the loan rate due to a basis point change in the interest rate on a Government 
Security with the same repayment duration equals 0.34.  This coefficient suggests 
sluggishness in loan rate adjustments, possibly due to the implicit interest rate insurance   27
offered by banks (e.g., Berlin and Mester (1998)), credit rationing (e.g., Fried and Howitt 
(1980) and Berger and Udell (1992)), or the downward drift in Belgian interest rates during 
our sample period.  This decrease in interest rates is actually reflected in our sample loan 
rates, as the (non-tabulated) coefficients on the two year dummies indicate that the average 
1995 (1996) loan rate is a significant 127 (18) basis points above the average 1997 loan rate, 
ceteris paribus.  A basis point parallel shift of the Term Spread implies a positive 0.57 basis 
point shift in the loan rate. 
2.  Rivals’ Organization and Communication Technology 
We now turn to the coefficients on the distance variables, and their relation with 
organizational structure.  We employ for each of our distance measures the log of (one plus) 
the distance, as we conjecture the marginal impact on the loan rate to decrease with distance.  
Model I in Table 4 is the fixed-effects equivalent of a specification in Degryse and Ongena 
(2005)(their Table V, Model III), which we will use as benchmark.  The negative and 
significant coefficients on ln(1+Distance to Lender) reveal that borrowers located farther 
away from the lender pay a lower loan rate at the lending bank; an increase of one standard 
deviation in the distance between the borrower and the lender (i.e. an increase from 0 of 7.3 
minutes) decrease the loan rate with 20 basis points.  The positive and significant coefficient 
on the variable ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors) shows that the lender’s market power 
increases with the distance between the borrower and the closest competitors; an increase of 
one standard deviation between the borrower and the closest competitor (i.e. an increase of 
2.3 minutes) increases the loan rate with 17 basis points.
6 
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low, 0.16, suggesting that these are independent effects.   28
Our theoretical model suggests that the organizational form of the closest competitors, and 
the associated implementation of lending technology, matters for the degree of spatial pricing.  
In Model II, we investigate whether the size of the closest competitor influences the severity 
of spatial pricing.  The results are displayed in the second column of Table 4.  We interact 
Large Bank with ln(1+Distance to Lender) and ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitor).  We 
expect that larger banks employ more hard information, implying that the degree of spatial 
pricing should be substantially lower.  Our results are in line with this expectation; the 
interaction term ln(1+Distance to Lender) * Large Bank is significantly positive while the 
interaction term ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitor) * Large Bank is significantly negative.  
This suggests that the degree of spatial pricing is lower when the closest competitor is a large 
bank.  Actually, when the closest (quartile) competitor is the largest bank (Large Bank = 1), 
then the degree of spatial pricing becomes close to zero as the sum of the coefficients on our 
distance variables and distance variables * Large Bank reveals.  In particular, the sum of the 
coefficients of ln(1+Distance to Lender) and ln(1+Distance to Lender) * Large Bank 
becomes -0.4 , and the sum of the coefficients on ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitor) and 
ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitor) * Large Bank becomes 6.8.  In contrast, the degree of 
spatial pricing when a small bank is the closest rival (Large Bank = 0) becomes substantially 
larger, as the coefficients on ln(1+Distance to Lender) and ln(1+Distance to Closest 
Competitor) tell us.  A one standard deviation increase of the distance to lender (from 0 to 7.3 
minutes) implies a drop in the loan rate of about 50 basis points and an increase of one 
standard deviation in the distance to closest competitor (0 to 2.3 minutes) yields an increase 
in the loan rate of about 35 basis points.  In the bottom rows of Table 4 we add the respective 
coefficients and test their equality to zero, to highlight the differential intensity of spatial 
pricing when rival banks are small (soft) or large (hard).  When rivals are hard, the bank does 
not practice spatial pricing; in contrast to when rivals are soft, the bank does.   29
Models III and IV in Table 4 deal with the Hierarchy at the closest competitor, at the bank 
and branch level respectively.  We expect that more hierarchically organized banks employ 
more hard information.  This seems to be the case when we employ the Hierarchy Bank 
measure.  Again when rivals are hierarchical, the own bank does not practice spatial pricing; 
in contrast to when rivals are soft, the bank does.  On the other hand, when we employ the 
Hierarchy Branch measure there is no evidence of spatial pricing in either case (but note that 
in this case we can no longer include the full set of control variables). 
Model V of Table 4 investigates whether the presence of a Foreign Bank in the 
neighborhood shapes spatial pricing. As before, we include an interaction term between our 
distance variables and Foreign Bank.  Again, though the interaction terms ln(1+Distance to 
Lender) * Foreign Bank and ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitor) * Foreign Bank 
themselves are not statistically significantly different from zero, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the bank practices spatial pricing when competitors are foreign (this result is 
reported in the bottom row of the table). 
Model VI of Table 4 includes Fax.  There is again no evidence of spatial pricing (but also in 
this case we can no longer include the full set of control variables).  Finally in Model VII, we 
include an interaction variable between our distance variables and Urban.  We find that the 
coefficient on ln(1+Distance to lender) *  Urban  is statistically negative; the severity of 
spatial pricing is sharper in urban areas possibly due to congestion. 
3.  Rivals’ Organization and Differential Pricing for Small Firms 
In Table 5, we assess whether the impact of rival banks’ organizational structure differently 
affects the severity of spatial pricing of “soft” borrowers.  We deal with this question by 
including interactions between the variables used in Table 4 and a dummy variable Small   30
Firm that equals one if the borrower is a small firm, and equals zero otherwise.
7  Our 
theoretical model predicts that spatial pricing becomes less sharp when large, hard or 
technologically advanced rivals are the closest competitors.  This effect, however, should be 
less pronounced for “soft” borrowers as “soft” banks have a comparative advantage for this 
group of firms.  We use small firms to proxy for “soft” borrowers, because small firms 
generally have less hard information than large firms.  The bank organizational variables used 
before (Large Bank, Hierarchy Bank, Hierarchy Branch, Foreign Bank, and Fax) capture the 
degree to which the rival is a “hard” bank, i.e., whether rivals are better equipped to process 
hard information.  As before, the dependent variable is the loan rate until the next revision (in 
basis points). 
In Model I of Table 5, we include the interactions with Small Firm but do not yet 
differentiate between different modes of bank organizational structure.  We find that spatial 
pricing is more pronounced for small firms, consistent with the notion that small firms do not 
generate as much hard information as medium-sized and large firms do.  Small borrowers 
located farther away from the lender pay a lower loan rate at the lending bank.  Although 
small firms exhibit larger spatial pricing, the effect is statistically not different relative to 
medium and large borrowers (the default category) as shown by the coefficient on the 
interaction term ln (1+ distance to lender)*small firm.  Similarly, we do not find a differential 
effect for small firms of the variable ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors) on loan pricing. 
In Models II to V of Table 5, we also introduce the organizational structure of the closest 
competitor banks.  In Model II, we include interactions with Large Bank. We find a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient for the variable ln(1+Distance to Lender) * Large Bank 
* Small Firms and a negative coefficient for the variable ln(1+Distance to Closest 
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Competitor) * Large Bank * Small Firms, consistent with our hypothesis that large banks are 
better equipped to process hard information.  The bottom rows of Table 4 further detail this 
finding: the difference in spatial pricing between small and large firms is more pronounced 
when a soft rival is the closest competitor (sum of coefficients –75,75*** versus –24,34**). 
Overall, we do not find any significant spatial pricing when large banks are the closest 
competitors. 
In Model III, we include Hierarchy Bank. Since this variable is constructed such that 
hierarchies with more layers (i.e., more complex hierarchies) obtain higher scores, we expect 
a positive coefficient for the variable ln(1+Distance to Lender) * Hierarchy Bank * Small 
Firm and a negative coefficient for the variable ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitor) * 
Hierarchy Bank * Small Firms. This is indeed what we find, although the effects are not 
statistically significant. 
Model IV shows the results when using Hierarchy Branch as measure of organizational 
structure. We again find a statistically significant differential effect of organizational structure 
and firm size on loan pricing for bank.  Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a positive 
significant coefficient on ln(1+Distance to Lender) * Hierarchy Branch * Small Firm and a 
negative and significant coefficient for the variable ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitor) * 
Hierarchy Branch * Small Firm. 
Finally, in model V we include interactions with the variable Fax.  We do not find that the 
presence of a fax has a differential effect on spatial pricing of small firms. 
Overall, we find supporting evidence that the organizational structure of competing banks 
has implications for the loan pricing of banks.  Spatial pricing towards small firms is more 
pronounced especially when the closest competitor is a “soft” bank.  The effect thus varies 
across firms of different size, consistent with our hypothesis that the bank’s mode of   32
organization influences the lending technology employed and determines whether the bank 
has a comparative advantage in “soft” or “hard” information. 
IV. Conclusions 
Recent theory highlights that the mode of firm organization determines agents’ incentives. 
Centralized hierarchical firms employ hard information whereas flat decentralized firms 
exploit soft information.  We present a stylized banking competition model incorporating the 
role of own and rivals’ organizational structure on lending technology employed, 
geographical reach and spatial pricing.  Our theoretical model predicts that when rival banks 
are more hierarchically organized, a bank’s geographical reach decreases, and the degree of 
spatial pricing reduces. 
Our empirical analysis employs two unique data sets, allowing us to combine information on 
firms’, lenders’, and rival banks’ locations, as well as the organizational structure of rival 
banks.  We find that the organizational form of the closest competitors matters for loan 
pricing.  In particular, the geographical reach and degree of spatial pricing of the bank branch 
hinge on the rivals’ organizational form.  Branch reach is lower when the closest competitors 
are large, foreign, hierarchical and technological advanced.  Large rival banks imply 
substantially lower spatial price discrimination.  This effect is more pronounced for small 
firms.  Also, the presence of a foreign bank in the vicinity of a borrower decreases the impact 
of geography on loan pricing.  To summarize, we show that the size and hierarchy of the 
closest bank rivals in the vicinity of a borrower determine geographical reach, spatial pricing, 
and banking competition.FIGURE 1. BRANCH SPATIAL PRICING, BRANCH REACH, AND PROFITABILITY 
The figure displays the impact of differential transportation costs on branch spatial pricing and branch reach. The transportation cost to branch 
A and B are tA and tB, respectively. 
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The figure displays the market share of A (on the horizontal axis) as a function of the hardness of the rival (on the vertical axis). 
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  1/(K+1) TABLE 1. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The table defines the variables employed in the empirical specifications and provides their mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation. The number of 
observations is 15,044.  
a The definition used by the bank to determine whether it is the main bank is: For single-person businesses and small firms, these have a turnover on 
the current account of at least BEF 100,000 per month and buy at least two products from that bank.  
b For bank-strategic considerations we cannot reveal the relative 
importance of the types of loans.  
c 40 Belgian Francs (BEF) are approximately equal to 1 US$ during the sample period.  The data sources (S) include Degryse and Ongena 
(2005) (D), Documenten en Aspecten (Documents and Aspects) published by the Belgische Vereniging van Banken (Belgian Bankers Association) (A), Bankkantoren in 
België (Bank Branches in Belgium) published by the Belgische Vereniging van Banken (Belgian Bankers Association) (B), and BelFirst (F). 
Variables  Definition  S  Mean  Median  Min.  Max.  St. Dev 
                Dependent variables               
Quartile Reach  Shortest traveling time to the quartile remote borrower of 
the branch, in minutes 
D  14.06  13  1  87  7.67 
Maximum Reach  Shortest traveling time to the most remote borrower of the 
branch, in minutes 
D  40.05  34  1  186  27.81 
Loan Rate  Interest rate on loan until next revision, in basis points  D  812  782  200  2,200  236 
               
Variables of interest               
Bank organization               
Large Bank  Asset size of the quartile closest competitors relative to the 
asset size of the largest bank 
A  0.617  0.678  0  1  0.174 
Hierarchy Bank  The number of layers of the quartile closest competitors 
relative to the bank that is the most hierarchically organized 
B  0.366  0.395  0  1  0.204 
Hierarchy Branch  The number of layers to the headquarters from the quartile 
closest competitors’ branches 
B  1.5  1.5  0  5  0.4 
Foreign Bank  Proportion of foreign banks among the quartile closest 
competitors 
A  0.035  0  0  1  0.101 
                Technology               
Fax  Relative proportion of the quartile closest competitors that 
has a fax number 





Variables  Definition  S  Mean  Median  Min.  Max.  St. Dev 
Urban  = 1 if borrower is located in agglomeration with > 250,000 
inhabitants 
D  0.093  0  0  1  0.296 
               
Geographical distance                
Distance to Lender  Shortest traveling time, in minutes  D  6.90  4.29  0.00  51.00  7.30 
Distance to Closest 
Competitors 
Shortest traveling time to the quartile closest competitor in 
the borrower’s postal zone, in minutes 
D  3.82  3.27  0.00  24.00  2.33 
               
Control variables               
Postal zone   Including 8 Postal Area Dummies             
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  The summed squares of bank market shares by number of 
branches in borrower’s postal zone 
B  0.17  0.15  0.05  1.00  0.11 
Number of Firms  Number of registered firms in the borrower’s postal zone, in 
thousands 
F  0.747  0.448  0.002  6.10  0.888 
                Relationship characteristics               
Main bank  = 1 if bank considers itself as main bank,
a in percent
  D  58.82  100  0  100  49.22 
Duration of Relationship  Length of relationship with current lender, in years  D  7.93  7.47  0.00  26.39  5.44 
                Contract characteristics  Including 4 Loan Revisability Dummies  D           
Collateral  = 1 if loan is secured via collateral, in percent  D  26.40  0  0  100  44.08 
Repayment Duration of Loan  Repayment duration of loan, in years  D  2.35  0.55  0.00  20.00  3.26 
                Loan purpose               
Mortgage   = 1 if loan is a business mortgage loan  D  n/a
b         
Term  = 1 if loan is a business term loan (investment credit)  D  n/a
b         
Securitizable term  = 1 if loan is a securitizable business term loan (investment 
credit) 
D  n/a





Variables  Definition  S  Mean  Median  Min.  Max.  St. Dev 
Bridge  = 1 if loan is a bridge loan  D  n/a
b         
Prepay taxes  = 1 if loan is credit to prepay taxes  D  n/a
b         
Consumer credit   = 1 if loan is a consumer credit loan (capturing installment 
loans) 
D  n/a
b         
Other   = 1 if loan is given for another purpose or its purpose is not 
specified 
D  n/a
b         
Rollover  = 1 if loan is given to prepay another loan, in percent  D  10.20  0  0  100  30.27 
                Firm characteristics  Including 49 Industry Dummies             
Small firm  = 1 if < 10 employees and turnover < 250 mln. BEF,
c in 
percent 
D  15.99  0  0  100  36.64 
Medium firm  = 1 if > 10 employees or turnover > 250 mln. BEF,
c in 
percent 
D  0.89  0  0  100  9.40 
Large firm  = 1 if turnover > 1 bln. BEF,
c in percent  D  0.14  0  0  100  3.73 
Limited Partnership  = 1 if firm is limited partnership, in percent  D  11.97  0  0  100  32.46 
Limited Partnership w/ ES  = 1 if firm is limited partnership with equal sharing, in 
percent 
D  1.18  0  0  100  10.78 
Corporation  = 1 if firm is corporation, in percent  D  3.78  0  0  100  19.07 
Temporary Arrangement  = 1 if firm is a temporary arrangement, in percent  D  0.85  0  0  100  9.18 
                Interest rate variables   Including 2 Year Dummies             
Government Security  Interest rate on a Belgian government security with equal 
repayment duration as loan to firm, in basis points 
D  389  350  305  805  87 
Term Spread  Yield on Belgian government bond of 5-years - yield on 
treasury bill with maturity of 3 months, in basis points 
D  179  177  100  268  31 TABLE 2. IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ON BRANCH REACH 
The table lists the coefficients from regressions with the indicated dependent variable.  Quartile (Maximum) Reach is the log of one plus the shortest traveling time to the 
quartile most remote borrower of the branch, in minutes.  Large Bank is the relative asset size of the closest quartile competitors.  Hierarchy Branch is the average number 
of layers to headquarters at the closest quartile competing competitors.  Hierarchy Bank is the average relative hierarchical bank complexity of the closest quartile 
competitors.  Foreign bank is the proportion of foreign banks among the closest quartile competitors.  Fax measures the relative proportion of the quartile closest 
competitors that has a fax number.  Urban equals one if the borrower is located in an urban area, and equals zero otherwise.  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the summed 
squares of bank market shares by number of branches in borrower’s postal zone.  Number of firms is the number of registered firms in the borrower’s postal zone, in 
thousands.  The other control variables are listed in Table 1 and for some specifications their coefficients are listed in an Appendix.   We employ ordinary least squares 
estimation.  The number of observations equals 15,044.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-tailed. 
Model
Dependent Variable
Large Bank -0.09 *** 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Hierarchy Bank -0.10 *** -0.09 *** -0.16 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Hierarchy Branch -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.10 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Foreign Bank 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.18 *** -0.15 **
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Fax -0.27 *** -0.27 *** -0.27 *** -0.50 *** -0.49 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Urban 0.00 0.00 0.04 * 0.04 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.12 *** 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.12 *** 0.05 * 0.04 0.05 -0.12 ** -0.10 **
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Number of Firms 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.08 *** 0.08 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Main Bank 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Duration of Relationship -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.01 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 *** -0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 2.45 *** 2.44 *** 2.50 *** 2.39 *** 2.73 *** 2.78 *** 2.86 *** 4.06 *** 4.18 ***
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.42) (0.42)
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

























TABLE 3. IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ON BRANCH REACH FOR SMALL FIRMS 
The table lists the coefficients from regressions with the indicated dependent variable.  Quartile (Maximum) Reach is the log of one plus the shortest traveling time to the 
quartile most remote borrower of the branch, in minutes.  Small Firm equals one if the borrower is a small firm, and equals zero otherwise.  Large Bank is the relative asset 
size of the closest quartile competitors.  Hierarchy Branch is the average number of layers to headquarters at the closest quartile competing competitors.  Hierarchy Bank is 
the average relative hierarchical bank complexity of the closest quartile competitors.  Fax measures the relative proportion of the quartile closest competitors that has a fax 
number.  The other control variables are listed in Table 1 and for some specifications their coefficients are listed in an Appendix.  We employ ordinary least squares 
estimation.  The number of observations equals 15,044.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-tailed. 
Model
Dependent Variable
Large Bank -0.11 ** -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Large Bank * Small Firm 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
Hierarchy Bank -0.18 *** -0.16 *** -0.18 ***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
Hierarchy Bank * Small Firm 0.10 ** 0.08 * 0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Hierarchy Branch -0.09 *** -0.08 *** -0.13 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Hierarchy Branch * Small Firm 0.02 0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Fax -0.35 *** -0.35 *** -0.35 *** -0.57 *** -0.57 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Fax * Small Firm 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.10 *** 0.08 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Small Firm -0.08 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06 -0.12 *** -0.13 *** -0.13 ** -0.16 **
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Constant and Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

















Quartile ReachTABLE 4. COMPETING BANKS’ ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND THE SEVERITY OF SPATIAL PRICING 
The table lists the coefficients from regressions with the loan rate until the next revision, in basis points, as the dependent variable.  Distance to lender is the shortest 
traveling time to the lender, in minutes.  Distance to closest competitor is the shortest traveling time to the closest quartile competitor, in minutes.  Large Bank is the 
relative asset size of the closest quartile competitors.  Hierarchy Branch is the average number of layers to headquarters at the closest quartile competing competitors.  
Hierarchy Bank is the average relative hierarchical bank complexity of the closest quartile competitors.  Foreign bank is the proportion of foreign banks among the closest 
quartile competitors.  Fax measures the relative proportion of the quartile closest competitors that has a fax number.  Urban equals one if the borrower is located in an 
urban area, and equals zero otherwise.  The other control variables are listed in Table 1 and for some specifications their coefficients are listed in an Appendix.  We employ 
ordinary least squares estimation.  The number of observations equals 15,044.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-tailed. 
Model
(Independent) Variable
ln (1 + Distance to Lender) -9.98*** -25.62*** -12.50** -10.65 -10.38*** -4.84 -7.88**
(2.99) (9.55) (5.30) (11.92) (3.16) (9.19) (3.19)
ln(1 + Distance to Lender) * Variable 25.18* 6.91 -2.16 9.11 -6.14 -16.37*
(14.68) (11.98) (7.53) (23.55) (5.86) (8.87)
ln(1 + Distance to Closest Competitor) 20.37*** 43.17*** 23.52*** 11.38 20.56*** 17.87 19.33***
(4.35) (12.17) (6.91) (15.73) (4.45) (11.34) (4.50)
ln(1 + Distance to Closest Competitor) * Variable -36.42** -8.68 3.73 1.89 0.40 7.68
(18.14) (14.84) (9.73) (27.90) (7.23) (17.93)
Relationship Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Control Variables Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed Postal Zone Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.17
Spatial Pricing
Soft Rival -25.62*** -12.50** -10.65 -10.38*** -4.84













BankTABLE 5. COMPETING BANKS’ ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND THE SEVERITY OF SPATIAL PRICING FOR SMALL FIRMS 
The table lists the coefficients from regressions with the loan rate until the next revision, in basis points, as the dependent variable.  Distance to lender is the shortest 
traveling time to the lender, in minutes.  Distance to closest competitor is the shortest traveling time to the closest quartile competitor, in minutes.  Small Firm equals one if 
the borrower is a small firm, and equals zero otherwise.  Large Bank is the relative asset size of the closest quartile competitors.  Hierarchy Branch is the average number 
of layers to headquarters at the closest quartile competing competitors.  Hierarchy Bank is the average relative hierarchical bank complexity of the closest quartile 
competitors.  Foreign bank is the proportion of foreign banks among the closest quartile competitors.  Fax measures the relative proportion of the quartile closest 
competitors that has a fax number.  Urban equals one if the borrower is located in an urban area, and equals zero otherwise.  The other control variables are listed in Table 
1 and for some specifications their coefficients are listed in an Appendix.  We employ ordinary least squares estimation.  The number of observations equals 15,044.  *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-tailed. 
M o d e l
(In d e p e n d e n t) V a ria b le
ln  (1  +  D ista n c e  to  L e n d e r) -1 1 .8 2 * * * -2 4 .3 4 * * -1 2 .9 8 * * 4 .0 3 -5 .5 4
(3 .3 9 ) (1 1 .8 0 ) (6 .4 5 ) (1 4 .6 9 ) (1 0 .7 4 )
ln (1  +  D ista n c e  to  L e n d e r) *  S m a ll F irm -9 .9 6 -5 1 .4 1 * * -2 4 .2 7 * -5 8 .0 3 * * 1 7 .0 4
(7 .3 2 ) (2 4 .7 7 ) (1 3 .9 7 ) (2 8 .1 6 ) (2 4 .0 4 )
ln (1  +  D ista n c e  to  L e n d e r) *  V a ria b le 2 0 .2 2 3 .5 2 -1 0 .4 8 -4 .5 9
(1 8 .3 3 ) (1 5 .1 2 ) (9 .3 7 ) (7 .0 1 )
ln (1  +  D ista n c e  to  L e n d e r) *  V a ria b le  *  S m a ll F irm 6 5 .6 1 * 3 7 .4 8 3 0 .1 8 * -1 7 .5 4
(3 8 .4 1 ) (3 4 .2 5 ) (1 7 .8 6 ) (1 5 .3 8 )
ln (1  +  D ista n c e  to  C lo se st C o m p e tito r) 1 5 .8 4 * * * 3 3 .2 9 * 2 4 .8 3 * * * 4 .0 9 2 7 .1 4 *
(4 .9 5 ) (1 7 .7 3 ) (9 .5 6 ) (2 0 .0 6 ) (1 5 .6 0 )
ln (1  +  D ista n c e  to  C lo se st C o m p e tito r) *  S m a ll F irm 5 .8 1 6 1 .5 2 * 1 6 .5 5 7 9 .8 7 * * -3 5 .5 0
(1 1 .3 6 ) (3 1 .8 8 ) (1 7 .9 9 ) (3 6 .4 5 ) (2 7 .8 3 )
ln (1  +  D ista n c e  to  C lo se st C o m p e tito r) *  V a ria b le -2 8 .0 2 -2 4 .5 6 8 .1 9 -6 .7 1
(2 7 .4 2 ) (2 3 .0 3 ) (1 2 .6 0 ) (1 0 .2 6 )
ln (1  +  D ista n c e  to  C lo se st C o m p e tito r) *  V a ria b le  *  S m a ll F irm -8 8 .7 1 * -2 9 .9 0 -4 9 .9 0 * * 2 8 .4 8
(5 0 .7 5 ) (4 7 .3 1 ) (2 3 .3 8 ) (1 9 .0 5 )
V a ria b le -9 .9 2 2 4 .7 1 1 1 .0 5 6 .9 1
(4 4 .3 5 ) (3 8 .6 0 ) (2 0 .8 9 ) (1 8 .1 2 )
V a ria b le  *  S m a ll F irm 1 5 .3 1 2 9 .5 6 1 0 .1 3 3 .3 2
(2 9 .6 2 ) (4 5 .8 2 ) (1 2 .2 0 ) (1 3 .6 1 )
R e la tio n sh ip  C h a ra c te ristic s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s
F ix e d  P o sta l Z o n e  E ffe c ts Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s Y e s
A d ju ste d  R -sq u a re d 0 .0 7 0 .0 7 0 .0 7 0 .0 7 0 .0 7
S p a tia l P r ic in g
L a rg e  F irm -1 1 .8 2 * * *
S m a ll F irm -2 1 .7 8 * * *
L a rg e  F irm , S o ft R iv a l -2 4 .3 4 * * -1 2 .9 8 * * 4 .0 3 -5 .5 4
L a rg e  F irm , H a rd  R iv a l -4 .1 3 -9 .4 5 * -4 8 .3 5 * * -1 0 .1 3 * *
S m a ll F irm , S o ft R iv a l -7 5 .7 5 * * * -3 7 .2 5 * * * -5 4 .0 1 * 1 1 .5 0
S m a ll F irm , H a rd  R iv a l 1 0 .0 8 3 .7 5 4 4 .5 3 -1 0 .6 3
V
F a x
H ie ra rc h y  
B ra n c h
H ie ra rc h y  
B a n k
I II IV
L a rg e  B a n k
IIIAPPENDIX. 
The table lists the coefficients from regressions with the indicated dependent variable.  All variables are 
defined in Table 1.  Gray cells were already reported in the other tables.  We employ ordinary least squares 
estimation.  The number of observations equals 15,044.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 





Large Bank 0.00 -0.03
Large Bank * Small Firm 0.04
Hierarchy Bank -0.09 *** -0.16 ***
Hierarchy Bank * Small Firm 0.08 *
Hierarchy Branch
Hierarchy Branch * Small Firm
Foreign Bank -0.02
Fax -0.27 *** -0.35 ***
Fax * Small Firm 0.09 ***
Urban 0.00 0.00
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.04 0.04
Number of Firms 0.06 *** 0.06 ***
ln (1 + Distance to Lender) -9.98 ***
ln (1 + Distance to Lender) * Small Firm
ln(1 + Distance to Closest Competitor) 20.37 ***
ln(1 + Distance to Closest Competitor) * Small Firm
Main bank 0.00 0.00 -55.01 ***
Duration of Relationship -0.02 *** -0.01 *** 23.51 ***
Collateral 0.05 *** 0.05 *** -38.26 ***
ln( 1 + Repayment Duration of Loan) 0.03 0.03 -95.40 ***
Mortgage  -0.04 -0.03 -29.43
Term -0.04 -0.05 -115.98 ***
Securitizable term -0.07 -0.07 7.02
Bridge -0.07 -0.06 -199.80 ***
Prepay taxes -0.44 -0.42 -104.35
Consumer credit  -0.02 -0.02 -80.40 ***
Rollover 0.02 0.02 15.47 **
Small firm 11.81
Medium firm -106.73 ***
Large firm -279.93 ***
Limited Partnership 1.55
Limited Partnership w/ ES 10.50
Corporation -64.42 ***
Temporary Arrangement -40.40
Government Security 34.04 ***
Term Spread -0.03 *** -0.03 *** 57.57 ***
Constant 2.78 *** 2.87 ***
Postal Zone Fixed Effects No No Yes
8 Postal Area Dummies Yes Yes No
4 Loan Revisability Dummies Yes Yes Yes
49 Industry Dummies Yes Yes No
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